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Abstract
This is a programmatic paper, marking out two direc-
tions in which the study of social media can contribute
to broader problems of social science: understanding
cultural evolution and understanding collective cogni-
tion. Under the first heading, I discuss some difficulties
with the usual, adaptationist explanations of cultural
phenomena, alternative explanations involving network
diffusion effects, and some ways these could be tested
using social-media data. Under the second I describe
some of the ways in which social media could be used to
study how the social organization of an epistemic com-
munity supports its collective cognitive performance.
Let me begin by considering two1 senses in which we
might speak of human thought as being “social”, and
how they might orient the study of social information
processing and social media.
The first sense is a common-place of many schools in
the social sciences and humanities: our thought relies
on the cultural transmission of cognitive tools. Every
individual thinker, no matter how innovative or even
lonely they may be, depends crucially on a vast array
of cognitive tools (concepts, procedures, languages, as-
sumptions, values, ...) which they did not devise them-
selves, and could not have devised for themselves. In-
stead they inherited these cognitive tools from interact-
ing with other people, who for the most part themselves
did not invent them. (Dewey 1927; Vygotsky 19341986;
Popper 1945; Balkin 1998)2 (Whether this dependence
on tradition is a logical necessity, or merely a reflection
Copyright c© 2018, Association for the Advancement of Ar-
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1Of course, people think a lot about their own and others’
social interactions, and a big use of social media is sharing
these thoughts. But in this social media are no different
from any other form of human, or for that matter primate,
association.
2“[K]nowledge is a function of association and communi-
cation; it depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods
socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned. Faculties
of effectual observation, reflection and desire are habits ac-
quired under the influence of the culture and institutions of
society, not ready-made inherent powers” (Dewey 1927, p.
158). Cf. (Popper 1945, ch. 23–24).
of our peculiar bounded rationality and bounded lifes-
pan, is a deep question, fortunately not relevant here.)
While individual thinkers invent and discover, it is
nonetheless true that innovations are typically refined,
extended and perfected by groups, and that it is very
rare indeed for highly developed concepts and ideas to
emerge from a single, isolated thinker, rather than from
a process of interaction (Toulmin 1972; Kitcher 1993;
Collins 1998; Ziman 2000).
The branches of social science for which these facts
are common-places have largely developed them philo-
sophically (Toulmin 1972; Turner 2002), or qualita-
tively (Vygotsky 19341986; 1978; Balkin 1998; Mercer
2000) or even ethnographically (Luria 1976; Hutchins
1995). (But see (Lupia, McCubbins, & Popkin 2000).)
In part this has been for reasons of cultural and in-
tellectual politics, as the relevant scholars have tended
to fall on the “interpretation” rather than “explana-
tion” side of the divide in the social sciences (Sperber
1996), so that attention to the social nature of thought
often goes along with more or less pronounced hostil-
ity to quantitative and computational modeling (e.g.
Hutchins; Mercer). This supposed opposition is thor-
oughly mis-guided (Frawley 1997), but it is not likely
that anyone will be argued out of it any time soon.
More promisingly, however, one good reason for de-
veloping this idea through small-scale qualitative stud-
ies has been that it was impossible to gather relevant
data, suitable for quantitative analysis, on any large
scale. With the rise of social media, however, many
people are, for their own purposes, generating exactly
this kind of data for us — traces of their communica-
tive interactions as they work out their thoughts about
matters of common concern. They are doing so on a
wide range of subjects, under a wide range of different
institutional mechanisms which structure their interac-
tions in many different ways, creating natural sources of
variation which the social scientist can try to exploit to
learn more about the effects of subject matter, of com-
municative structure, and of other factors on cultural
dynamics, and perhaps ultimately even on innovation
and discovery. The next section points out some of
the outstanding problems and methodological pitfalls
of this area.
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The other important sense in which human thought
can be “social” is that it seems to make sense to regard
at least some human social institutions as, themselves,
information-processing systems, engaging in computa-
tions which cannot be localized to representations in
the mind of any one of their members. On large scales,
market economies, corporations and other bureaucra-
cies, scientific disciplines, and democratic polities all
have something of this collective information-processing
character. Knowing how they accomplish this would
be deeply rewarding, and, if that understanding can
be used to make them work better, of profound eco-
nomic and political importance. A frontal assault on
this problem, as represented by one of those grand insti-
tutions, is unlikely to succeed (though it may be a mag-
nificent failure). Fortunately, social information pro-
cessing also occurs in much humbler institutions, such
as tagging systems and collaborative filtering, where is-
sues of data collection and even experimental manipu-
lation are much more manageable, and where we might
hope to learn more, before tackling the fundamental
problems of social science. I will lay out some of what
should be on the agenda of the study of social infor-
mation processing, in particular points of contact with
machine learning.
Cultural Evolution
“Culture is the precipitate of cognition and communi-
cation in a human population” (Sperber 1996). That
is, cultural traits — beliefs, practices, habits, conven-
tions, expressions, norms — are not just ones which are
common across a population, but ones which are spread
across a population because its members communicate
with one another. (Knowing that it’s painful to look at
the sun directly is not cultural; knowing that the direc-
tion in which the sun rises is called “east” is cultural.)
Cultural phenomena are thus emergent, the result of
the communicative interaction of cognitive agents. If
we are to understand how cultures work, we need to
understand something about both parts, the internal
cognitive mechanisms and the effects of different pat-
terns of interaction. Social media offer a window into
the communicative part of the problem of unrivaled
clarity and breadth. This is extremely exciting, but
in looking through this window we should bear in mind
some methodological difficulties to interpreting the view
through this window.
It is a common-place observation that there are
strong relationships between cultural traits and so-
cial attributes; that different social groups accept and
transmit different bits of culture. Most attempts to
explain this from within the social sciences (emphat-
ically including historical materialism (Elster 1985;
Cohen 2000) and its variants) argue that this is due
to some causal influence of social organization on the
content of culture. (“Social being determines con-
sciousness” (Marx & Engels 18471947) — or, once
the Hegelian gas has been released, social life shapes
thought.) In these views, culture varies with social po-
sition because the former is adapted to the latter, or
reflects it, or expresses it.
It is natural for us, as beings acutely sensitive to nu-
ances of cultural meanings, to try to explain cultural
differences by trying to explain the content of widely-
shared, cultural representations. It is natural to sup-
pose that, say, one news story rises to the top of a
social aggregation system because it is more interesting
than other stories which did not. Such explanations are
even valid a lot of the time. It is nonetheless important,
as a point of methodological hygiene, to develop ways
of telling when some bit of culture succeeds in propa-
gating because its content fits its circumstances, if only
because, being creatures acutely sensitive to nuances of
cultural meanings, it is far too easy for us to spin such
stories no matter what the truth might be. Lieberson
(2000) points out that many widely-accepted explana-
tions of trends in fashions, children’s names, etc., can-
not possibly be right (because, e.g., the trend pre-dates
or is more widely spread than the supposed cause), and
that these are instead better explained by purely in-
ternal mechanisms of the respective fields. In biology,
adaptive and non-adaptive evolution are demarcated by
means of neutral models. These are models of the ge-
netic changes which would be expected due to reproduc-
tive mechanisms and chance alone, all genetic variants
being assumed to be “adaptively neutral”, i.e., of equal
fitness. Only when actual populations depart markedly
from the predictions of neutral models can adapta-
tion be (reliably) inferred (Nitecki & Hoffman 1987;
Harvey & Pagel 1991). Before the student of social
media, or other cultural media, can start explaining
phenomena by reference to content, they need to check
that there actually is something to be explained.
A highly simplistic model may make this point more
concrete. Consider a network in which people have two
binary traits, one of which is stable (we may think
of this as “class” or “race” or some similar status),
and the other is changeable (think of fashions, or po-
litical opinions). Assume that the network is assor-
tative on the stable, social-type trait, so that people
are more likely to be linked to others of the same
type than those of a different type. Such “assorta-
tivity” or “homophily” is observed in many, perhaps
most social networks, often on such stable social-status
type variables (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook 2001;
Newman 2003). Now assign the cultural trait to peo-
ple uniformly and independently of their social trait (or
anything else). Initially, then, there will be no correla-
tion between social and cultural traits, and no assorta-
tivity based on culture.
We might expect such correlations to appear if the
process of cultural transmission and retention is biased
— if, say, certain cultural values only make sense for
those in certain social positions. In that case, we would
expect to find a growing “fit” between cultural and so-
cial variables, as the former adapt to the latter. But by
this point you will not be surprised to learn that neu-
tral transmission processes can also induce such cor-
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Figure 1: Neutral copying induces correlations between so-
cial and cultural traits in assortative networks. The graph
has 100 nodes, randomly divided between two social types
(equally probable), and a binary-valued cultural trait (ini-
tially equally probable). Edges between nodes of the same
type occur with probability p1, those between different types
have probability p2. At each time step, a random node
copies the cultural trait of a random neighbor. Horizontal
axis: time. Vertical axis: χ2 statistic for the correlation be-
tween the social and cultural variables. Black line: behavior
of an assortative network (p1 = 0.09, p2 = 0.01, assortativ-
ity coefficient (Newman 2003) of realized graph r = 0.80).
Note the eventual decline of χ2 as the network moves to-
wards a homogeneous equilibrium; in the very long run it
will reach 0. Grey line: behavior of a non-assortative net-
work (p1 = p2 = 0.05, r = 0.045).
relations. To be specific, let’s implement the “voter
model” (Liggett 1985): at each discrete time step, a
node is chosen uniformly at random, independently of
past and future choices. This node chooses a neigh-
bor (again uniformly and independently), and copies
its value of the cultural trait.
Clearly, in a connected network, there are two ab-
sorbing states, which are culturally homogeneous, and
eventually the network must settle into one or the other
of them, but the time it takes to do so will typically
be quite long (Sood & Redner 2005). In the mean-
while, if the network is socially assortative, numerical
experiments (Fig. 1) show that the social and the cul-
tural traits tend to become correlated during a long
“meta-stable” period.3 If I’d said that the social types
3One could say that the cultural trait of a node is still
“in the final analysis” determined by its social type, but
only with the proviso that the over-all structure of the net-
work “screens off” the latter, rendering it causally irrelevant
were “lower class” and “middle class”, and the cultural
traits “likes black velvet paintings” and “likes black and
white photographs”, the temptation to explain the cor-
relation by content would be overwhelming (Bourdieu
1984). Nonetheless, which way the correlation went
would be a matter of pure chance, or more exactly of
the reinforcement and amplification of small fluctua-
tions, though some such pattern forms with high prob-
ability. (This contrast between long- and medium- run
behavior is not uncommon in self-reinforcing network
processes (Pemantle & Skyrms 2004).) The strength
of the dynamically-induced correlations depends on the
assortativity of the social network; if it is not assorta-
tive, then the correlations between social and cultural
traits only rarely rise above the levels to be expected
by chance (Fig. 1).
Social scientists interested in communications have
appreciated for a long time that network structure is
very important to how information flows through a so-
cial group (Katz & Lazarsfeld 1955; Huckfeldt, Johnson,
& Sprague 2004), but they have not, so far as I know, re-
alized that it can create just the kind of correlation that
seems to cry out for an explanation by content. In fact,
the real situation is somewhat worse than this, because
it really isn’t a given that people change because of in-
teracting with their neighbors. It could well be that
people have neighbors who are similar to themselves,
and so they all respond similarly to common exoge-
nous causes, without any direct interactions (Steglich,
Snijders, & Pearson 2004).4 If one thinks of trying to
explain why certain users prefer certain kinds of news
stories, for example, one must account not only assor-
tativity, but also for common exposure to some outside
news source. — None of this, incidentally, requires that
people actually make decisions randomly, but only that
the reasons which lead them to their decisions are ef-
fectively unpredictable from the other variables in the
system.
The moral is not that these kinds effect explain all
correlations between social and cultural traits, or even
between different cultural traits. Rather, it shows that
a neutral explanation is logically possible. To support
an adaptive explanation of a correlation, then, one must
show some way in which the neutral model is not ad-
equate to the data. For example, additional experi-
ments (not shown) indicate that, if I take the model
simulated in Fig. 1 and break the graph into commu-
nities (following Newman & Girvan (2003)), then so-
cial type and cultural traits are conditionally indepen-
dent, given community membership, even in strongly-
assortative networks. This conditional independence
does not hold when different social types have differing
biases for or against various cultural traits. Only when
we have found and verified such discrepancies between
(Galles & Pearl 1997).
4This possibility seems to confound the claims of the re-
cent, and widely-publicized, study of the spread of obesity
in a social network (Christakis & Fowler 2007).
our data and the predictions of a good neutral model
can we say that the adaptive explanation has passed a
severe test and truly has evidence in its support (Mayo
1996).
Collective Cognition
It’s been recognized since the 1930s that market
economies are “collective calculating devices” (Lange
& Taylor 1938; Hayek 1948). A market-clearing allo-
cation of good and services is simply too big for any-
one to grasp, let alone find. Instead it is the process
of exchange itself which adaptively finds and imple-
ments this allocation.5 This is an example of what
we might call collective cognition, by analogy to the
classical (Mancur Olson 1971) “collective action”. Sim-
ilarly, the problems of designing policies for govern-
ments are largely beyond the scope of what anyone
can actually do, but not beyond the scope of demo-
cratic deliberation, which reduces the problem from
solving for the optimal policy in one stroke, to criti-
cizing and improving policies piecemeal (Braybrooke &
Lindblom 1963), in light of the information and ideas
of many participants. (Popper 1945; Lindblom 1965;
Ober 2005) (Historically, democratic decision-making
has been associated with more social power than other
forms of government (McNeill 1982), but the causality
is unclear.) Similar remarks apply to bureaucratic or-
ganizations, such as corporations, and to scientific dis-
ciplines.
It is notable that modern societies are vastly better
at collective cognition than earlier ones. The degree
of organization, and its precision, which we take for
granted would have been astonishing for even the in-
habitants of the most advanced societies c. 1600, to
say nothing of c. 100. Historians have explored some
of the technical and institutional underpinnings of these
organizational revolutions (McNeill 1982; Beniger 1986;
Yates 1989), but at a deeper level we have little idea why
this is so, or why what we do works (when it does work).
This makes it harder to improve the functioning of our
institutions for collective cognition. Economic theories
of mechanism design attempt to do so, but largely ad-
dress the problem of motivating people to act in certain
ways, rather than of how to figure out what the right
action is (Miller 1992).
These are all very large themes indeed, of course, and
it might seem grandiose to even mention them in this
context. I am not suggesting that studying social me-
dia will give us the key to all organization technologies.
What it can do, however, is give us a set of case studies
where, on a much humbler level, people are nonetheless
engaged in social information processing and collective
cognition. Just as no one market participant decides on
or represents the over-all market allocation, and no one
scholar ever grasps more than a small portion of what
is known about conic sections or cellular slime molds,
5On the formal computational power of market-like sys-
tems, see (Walsh et al. 2003).
the movies or bookmarks which get recommended by
collaborative filtering services are the emergent prod-
ucts of the interactions of many participants (Lerman
2007). What social media offer us, again, is the possi-
bility to automatically collect large-scale data on such
phenomena, combined with a clear understanding of
the interaction structure (or at least a lot of it), as well
as much of the external circumstances and the goals
of the group. We can thus begin, at least at a small
scale, to begin building and systematically testing the-
ories which explain how social information processing
and collective cognition succeed when they do.
It might be thought that the theoretical explanation
is rather simple, and goes (currently) under the name
of “the wisdom of crowds” (Surowiecki 2004): individ-
uals make noisy guesses, which on average are unbiased
and uncorrelated, so simple averaging leads to conver-
gence on the appropriate answer. Taken seriously, this
explanation implies that our economy, our sciences and
our polities manage to work despite their social organi-
zation, that science (for example) would progress much
faster if scientists did not collaborate, did not read each
others’ papers, etc. While every scientist feels this way
occasionally, it is hard to take seriously. Clearly, there
has to be an explanation for the success of social in-
formation processing other than averaging uncorrelated
guesses, something which can handle, and perhaps even
exploit, statistical dependence between decision mak-
ers.
A particularly interesting line of attack on these prob-
lems is suggested by the analogy with ensemble meth-
ods in machine learning. As Domingos (1999) has
pointed out, the success of these methods seems to con-
found naive interpretations of Occam’s Razor, in much
the same way that the success of social information pro-
cessing confounds the simple “wisdom of the crowds”
story. Ensemble methods, in which large numbers of
low-capacity classifiers or predictors (e.g., shallow clas-
sification trees) are combined, effectively create a sin-
gle model of what appears to be very high capacity,
and so they appear to be nothing but an invitation to
over-fitting. Worse, typically ensemble methods such as
boosting (Hastie, Tibshirani, & Friedman 2001), bag-
ging (Breiman 1996) and mixtures of experts (Jacobs
1997) create correlated low-level predictors, so that the
simple average-the-crowd story is inapplicable. In fact,
it is precisely because the component predictors are cor-
related, but not identical, that the actual capacity of the
ensemble is much smaller than its apparent capacity.
A similar result holds for cooperative problem-solving
(Hong & Page 2004). Under mild conditions, it can be
shown that a large group of “weak” heuristic problem-
solvers, whose performance in isolation is only slightly
better than random search, will actually out-perform a
similarly-sized group of “strong” heuristics, ones whose
average performance in isolation is much better. One of
those conditions, however, is that the problem-solvers
must be able to communicate with each other, mak-
ing their candidate solutions strongly dependent rather
than uncorrelated. There is good evidence that this
beneficial effect of heuristic diversity and communica-
tion is actually seen in the cognitive performance of hu-
man groups (Page 2007). This suggests a very promis-
ing direction for research on social information pro-
cessing, namely to use the mathematical techniques
of statistical learning theory to establish bounds on
the performance of suitable sorts of ensemble-learners
and group problem-solvers, and see how close actual
social information processing systems come to attain
those bounds, and how the latter could be improved by
changes to their architectures.
Both ensemble methods and the Hong & Page re-
sults on diverse heuristics posit relatively simple forms
of “social” organization, such as direct averaging, or
passing a problem to the next person able to improve
on the current solution. There is every reason to think,
however, that the optimal form of organization will ac-
tually depend on the structure of the problem being
solved. (Cf. Braybrooke & Lindblom (1963) on how the
social organization of policy analysts serves their cog-
nitive strategy of “disjointed incrementalism.”) In par-
ticular, coordination over time is not an issue in ensem-
ble methods, and handled by assumption in the Hong
& Page model, but extremely important in real-world
systems for social information processing and collective
cognition.
This suggests a final line of research, one which draws
together ideas from distributed systems, economics and
statistical mechanics. Experience with distributed sys-
tems shows that often the hardest part of their design is
ensuring coordination over time, and that failure to do
so can lead to all manner of unwanted behavior, in par-
ticular to wild oscillations and/or locking into deeply
undesirable configurations (Lynch 1996). In fact, the
failure modes of distributed systems are strongly remi-
niscent of the pathologies of economic (Chamley 2004)
and statistical-mechanical (Young 1998) models of so-
cial learning, when they are placed in suitable (that is,
unsuitable) situations. Designing, or reforming, a sys-
tem for computer-mediate social information processing
is at once a problem of distributed algorithm design and
a problem of mechanism design, and they two modes or
aspects should inform one another, as well as empirical
results about what actually happens when real human
beings use different systems for different tasks.
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